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L INTRODUCTION
Section 365 (a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Bankruptcy Code)1 grants a trustee the power to assume or re-
ject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
1. Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2574 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 will hereinafter be referred to as either the
Bankruptcy Code or the Code, and cited to section numbers only.
Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States in 1970 to study and recommend changes in the Bankruptcy Act. Act of
July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission submitted its
final report to Congress in two sections. The first part reported the Commis-
sion's general findings and recommendations, and the second part presented a
draft of a bill designed to implement those recommendations. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, pts. I & II, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUFrCY
COMMISSION REPORT].
The Commission's draft was presented to Congress as H.R. 31, 94th Cong,
1st Sess. (1975), and as S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Commission's bill], reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Revision Hearings on H.R?. 31
and H.R 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 27 (1975-1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32]. The National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges responded to the Commission's bill with a proposal of its
own, which was introduced in Congress as H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
and as S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judges' bill], re-
printed in Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra, app.
The bankruptcy reform bills underwent revision in the House, emerging
finally as H.R. 8200,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The House bill and its compan-
ion in the Senate, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), were the subject of hear-
ings in the Senate and reports by both Houses. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REp. No. 989], reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as HR. REP. No. 595], reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R,.
8200 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
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The trustee's power, however, is subject to the court's approval
and the limitations set forth in section 365.2 This Article will
explore those limitations and the trustee's rights and obliga-
tions when he assumes or rejects.
Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants a trustee the
power to abandon "property of the estate that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate."3 At
common law, the trustee's power to reject executory contracts
and unexpired leases grew out of his power to abandon burden-
some property.4 Burdensome executory contracts can be con-
ceptualized as a class of property that the trustee can
abandon.5 Although Congress codified the trustee's power to
reject contracts and leases in section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act in 1938,6 Congress did not codify the trustee's power to
abandon property until the enactment of section 554 in 1978.
The reasons for the separate treatment of the power to re-
ject executory contracts and unexpired leases and the power to
abandon burdensome property are not entirely clear. One com-
mentator has suggested that Congress enacted section 70(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act to benefit the nondebtor party to an execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease by requiring the trustee to de-
cide whether to assume or reject within a fixed time.7 This,
however, does not explain why Congress delayed granting a
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200].
The House bill, H.R. 8200, and the Senate bill, S. 2266, differed slightly from
each other and from the Bankruptcy Code as it was eventually passed. In place
of a conference committee report, the legislative leaders in favor of the bill read
substantially similar statements into the Congressional Record to explain the
differences between the bills and the Code as it was passed. The explanatory
statement of Representative Edwards appears in 124 CONG. REc. H11089 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Rep. Edwards], reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6436. The statement of Senator DeCon-
cini appears in 124 CONG. REc. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Statement of Sen. DeConcini], reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6505.
2. Section 365(a) also states that sections 765 and 766 of the Bankruptcy
Code limit the trustee's power to assume or reject; however, those sections,
which deal with commodity broker liquidation, are beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
3. Bankruptcy Code § 554(a).
4. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.01[1] (15th ed. 1979); Silverstein,
Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHL
L. REV. 467, 468-69 (1964).
5. See Note, Abandonment of Assets by a Trustee, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 415,
417 (1953).
6. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
7. See Silverstein, supra note 4, at 473. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 365.01[2] (15th ed. 1979). See also text accompanying note 103 infra.
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similar benefit to a nondebtor party with an interest in prop-
erty that the trustee might abandon.8 Historical accident may
best account for the separate statutory development and treat-
ment of the power to reject and the power to abandon.
The Code, like the Bankruptcy Act, does not define the
term "executory contract." The legislative history of the Code
and the majority of cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act in-
dicate that an executory contract is one in which neither side
has fully performed at the commencement of bankruptcy. The
House and Senate reports statec
Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it
generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an executory contract
if the only performance that remains is repayment. Performance on
one side of the contract would have been completed and the contract is
no longer executory.
9
The Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States defined executory contracts with greater specific-
ity by quoting Professor Countryman: "[A]n executory con-
tract is one 'under which the obligation of the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract is so far unperformed that the fail-
ure of either to complete performance would constitute a mate-
rial breach excusing the performance of the other.' "10 Several
cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act also adopted Profes-
sor Countryman's definition of executory contracts.'1 Those
cases under the Bankruptcy Act which held that a contract is
executory if either party has not fully performed at the com-
mencement of bankruptcy should be disregarded in view of the
legislative history of the Code.12
8. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a "party in interest" is allowed to request
the court to "order the trustee to abandon any property that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." Bankruptcy Code
§ 554(b).
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 347, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6303-04; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 58, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5787, 5844.
10. BANKRUPTcY CO mussION REPORT, supra note 1, pt. I, at 155 (quoting
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. I. REV. 439,
460 (1973)).
11. See, e.g., Chattanooga Mem. Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 352
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978) (holding that a contract is not execu-
tory if it has already been breached by the debtor and reduced to final judg-
ment; reasoning in part that the debtor has no future obligation to perform);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916, 917 (8th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (holding that an unused airline ticket for which the debtor
has not paid is an executory contract).
12. See, e.g., Walsh v. Paterna (In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co.), 537 F.2d
329, 333 (9th Cir. 1976) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp.
1113, 1115 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
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The trustee should reject executory contracts and
unexpired leases when the estate would benefit through relief
from burdensome obligations; 13 the trustee should assume ex-
ecutory contracts and unexpired leases that would "assist in
the debtor's rehabilitation or liquidation."'14 A set of examples
will show how the definition of executory contracts meshes
with the trustee's objectives in deciding whether to assume or
reject.
Assume that B contracts to buy one thousand bushels of
corn from S at $2.00 per bushel. One month later, on May 15, B
files for bankruptcy. If S has already delivered the corn, the
contract is no longer executory, and the trustee cannot reject
B's obligation under the contract. The trustee may be able to
object to S's claim against the estate, but S's performance pre-
cludes the trustee's rejection of B's correlative obligation to S.
If S has not delivered by May 15, but B has paid, there is no
executory contract for the trustee to assume. S has an obliga-
tion to deliver, and the trustee can sue for any breach of that
obligation. Now assume that B has not paid for the corn by
May 15, and S has not delivered by that date. Because neither
party has fully performed, the contract is executory. The
trustee's rejection could relieve the estate of a burdensome ob-
ligation, or the trustee's assumption could aid in rehabilitation.
The market price of corn determines whether the trustee
should assume or reject. If corn is selling at $3.00 per bushel on
May 15, the trustee should assume the contract and earn $1,000
for the estate. If corn is selling at $1.50 per bushel, the trustee
should reject the contract to relieve the estate of the burden-
some obligation of buying one thousand bushels of corn at fifty
cents per bushel over the market price.15
This Article will set forth the important provisions of the
law on executory contracts and unexpired leases in bank-
ruptcy. The law has two components: the Bankruptcy Code
and the common law developed under the Bankruptcy Act that
is consistent with the Code. The first section of this Article ex-
plains the limitations on the trustee's power to assume or as-
sign leases. These limitations arise in contracts and leases
13. See Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 1979)
(the power to reject executory contracts "is to be exercised in situations where
the estate will be benefitted").
14. I.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6304; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5845.
15. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANxnurrcy 365.03 (15th ed. 1979).
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terminated before bankruptcy, contracts and leases with bank-
ruptcy clauses, contracts and leases that are nondelegable, con-
tracts and leases in which there has been a default, and
contracts and leases that the trustee intends to assign after as-
sumption. The next section sets forth the trustee's rights and
liabilities under executory contracts and unexpired leases. The
subsections cover contracts and leases that the trustee has
neither assumed nor rejected, contracts and leases that the
trustee has assumed, and contracts and leases that the trustee
has rejected. The final section discusses real property leases in
which the debtor is the landlord and installment land sale con-
tracts in which the nondebtor buyer is in possession. The Code
singles out these contracts and leases for special treatment.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE TRUSTEE'S POWER TO
ASSUME OR ASSIGN CERTAIN EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED LEASES
A. CONTRACTS AND LEASES TERMINATED BEFORE BANKRUPTCY
Generally, the trustee cannot assume a contract or lease
that was validly terminated before bankruptcy under state or
other applicable law.16 For example, in Allan v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co. (In re Commodity Merchants, Inc.),'7 the debtor
entered into four futures contracts 18 for the purchase of com-
modities. These contracts included clauses allowing the seller
to terminate if the buyer's financial condition became "unsatis-
factory."' 9 The seller terminated the contracts under these
clauses, and ten days later the buyer was adjudicated a bank-
rupt. The trustee then attempted to assume the contracts. The
court held that, under state law, the termination clauses were
valid and indicated that the seller had properly terminated the
contracts. Accordingly, "[s]ince the contracts were no longer
executory at the time of [the buyer's] bankruptcy, the bank-
ruptcy trustee's purported assumption.., was a nullity. '20
The trustee, however, can sometimes set aside a prebank-
16. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, .supra note 1, pt. H, at 156 ("an
executory contract or unexpired lease terminated pursuant to a contractual
provision or nonbankruptcy law prior to the date of the petition because of a
default of the debtor cannot be assumed under [section 365]").
17. 538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976).
18. Under these contracts, the debtor bought an option to purchase an
amount of a commodity for a set price on a given future date.
19. 538 F.2d at 1262 n.1.
20. Id. at 1262. See Chattanooga Mem. Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d
349, 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978) (the executory contract pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act do not apply to an installment sales contract for
[Vol. 64.341
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ruptcy termination of a contract or lease as a fraudulent trans-
fer. He can then assume the contract or lease as if it had not
been terminated. In Darby v. Atkinson (In re Ferris),2 1 the
landlord terminated the debtor's lease one week before bank-
ruptcy because of the debtor's failure to pay rent. The court,
applying state law, held that the landlord had properly termi-
nated the lease,22 but it then affirmed the bankruptcy judge's
finding that the termination was a fraudulent transfer. The
Court noted that, before the termination, the landlord received
$875 per month net from the leased property. After termina-
tion, the landlord received $1,860 per month net and $129,000
worth of improvements that the debtor had put into the prop-
erty. In short, the termination was a fraudulent transfer be-
cause what the landlord "got by the termination far
outweigh[ed] what he gave up.... [T]he lease was a good
bargain and not a burdensome obligation [for the bankrupt ten-
ant]. *23
B. CONTRACTS AND LEASES WITH BANKRUPTCY CLAUSES
Bankruptcy clauses terminate or modify contracts or leases
in the event of the bankruptcy of one party.24 Contracting par-
ties and landlords often add bankruptcy clauses to their agree-
ments because they fear that the trustee, even if he assumes
the contract or lease, will not provide them with the full benefit
of the bargain they made with the debtor.25 Under the Bank-
the perpetual care of burial spaces that was breached by the debtor and re-
duced to judgment before the filing of the petition).
21. 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
22. See id. at 39.
23. Id. at 41. Cf. Allan v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (In re Commodity
Merchants, Inc.), 538 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1976), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 17-20 supra, (holding that the seller's termination of commodity
futures contracts did not transfer any of the debtor's property because the con-
tracts did not have any market value).
24. Consider, for example, the following bankruptcy clause, drafted for a
fast-food franchise agreement:
Licensor shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon notice
in writing to Operator mailed to the above described premises upon
the occurrence of any of the following events:
(a) Should Operator be declared insolvent or bankrupt, or make
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or in the event that a re-
ceiver is appointed or any proceeding is demanded by, for, or against
Operator under any provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act or any
amendment thereof.
IA J. RABEIN & M. JOHNSON, CuRRENT LEGAL FoRms WrrH TAx ANALYsIs, Form
3.45, 17, at 3-2010 (1979).
25. The House and Senate reports explicity recognized this fear, stating
that "the courts will have to insure that the trustee's performance ... gives the
other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
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ruptcy Act, bankruptcy clauses could preclude the trustee's as-
sumption of a contract or lease by terminating the agreement
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.26
Section 365(e) of the Code invalidates bankruptcy clauses
and any limitations they might otherwise place on the trustee's
power to assume a contract or lease:
(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or
unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and
any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be termi-
nated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case
solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is condi-
tioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a
case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.
27
note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6304-05; S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5845.
26. Bankruptcy clauses in contracts were enforceable under section 70b of
the Bankruptcy Act. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 (repealed
1978). See 2 COLLIER ON BANIUPTcY 365.06 (15th ed. 1979). In leases, how-
ever, only express covenants terminating the agreement upon the filing of
bankruptcy were enforceable. See id. The distinction between express and
general covenants became blurred as courts sometimes exercised their equity
powers to prevent the termination of leases necessary to the debtor's rehabili-
tation. Compare In re D.H. Overmyer, Co., 510 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975) with
Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974). See
also Commercial Trading Co. v. Lansburgh (In re Garfinkle), 577 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir. 1978).
27. Bankruptcy Code § 365(e). The section continues:
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such
contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delega-
tion of duties, if-
(A) (i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor,
to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or ren-
dering performance to the trustee or to an assignee of such con-
tract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption or as-
signment; or
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the ben-
efit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor.
Id. Section 365(e) (2) gives precedence to section 365(c) over section 365(e) (1).
Thus, if applicable law excuses the nonbankrupt party from rendering perform-
ance to or receiving performance from the trustee, the contract cannot be
assumed without the nonbankrupt party's consent. See text accompanying
note 37 infra. Section 365(e) must also be read in light of the statement that it
does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause if a
new insolvency or receivership occurs after the bankruptcy case is
closed. That is, the clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely made
[Vol. 64:341
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Congress passed section 365(e) because bankruptcy clauses
"frequently [hamper] rehabilitation efforts. '28 Under the
Bankruptcy Act, lessors would often take advantage of a tenant
who filed for rehabilitation by terminating the lease under a
bankruptcy clause and then finding another tenant willing to
pay higher rent.29 Occasionally the lease termination would
preclude any possibility of rehabilitation.
The fact that section 365(e) invalidates bankruptcy clauses
in liquidation cases as well as rehabilitation cases indicates
that Congress intended to deny the nonbankrupt party to an
executory contract or unexpired lease any windfall from the
fortuity of the debtor's bankruptcy. At the same time, if the
nonbankrupt party made a good bargain with the debtor, the
trustee can deny the nonbankrupt party the benefit of that bar-
gain by rejecting the agreement. Assume, for example, that the
executory contract for the sale of corn by S to B at $2.00 per
bushel has a bankruptcy clause. If the market price of corn
rose to $3.00 per bushel by the time of B's bankruptcy, S could
have reaped a windfall of $1.00 per bushel under the Bank-
ruptcy Act by terminating the contract. Under the Code, sec-
tion 365(e) voids the bankruptcy clause and allows the trustee
to preserve B's good bargain for the benefit of the general cred-
itors. If the price of corn fell to $1.50 per bushel, both the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Code would allow the trustee to reject the
agreement, leaving S with only a general claim for the benefit
of his bargain.
The invalidation of bankruptcy clauses under the Code
may affect negotiations between contracting parties. Land-
lords, for example, may demand higher rents because of the
risk that the trustee will be an undesirable tenant.30 Congress
inapplicable during the case for the purposes of disposition of the exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5845. The House Report contains a similar statement. See H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 1, at 349, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6305.
28. HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6305; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5845. The invalidation of bankruptcy
clauses is simply an application of the principle that the trustee takes title to
the debtor's property upon bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy
clauses permitted the debtor to arrange in advance for the transfer, upon bank-
ruptcy, of his interest in an executory contract or unexpired lease.
29. See Coogan, Broude & Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provi-
sions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149, 1179 (1975), reprinted
in Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra note 1, pt. I, at 399, 429.
30. See Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra note 1, pt. I, at 1867; Note,
1980]
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attempted to assuage the concerns of landlords and others in
the Code's legislative history:
[Section 365(e)] will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of
the nondebtor party to executory contracts and unexpired leases. If
the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the court will have to in-
sure that the trustee's performance under the contract or lease gives
the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.3 1
This explanation directs the courts to withhold approval of the
trustee's assumption of an agreement under section 365(a) if
the trustee's likely performance will not give the nonbankrupt
party the benefit of his bargain.
A party unwilling to assume the risk that the trustee's per-
formance will fall short of his expectations can no longer pro-
tect himself with a bankruptcy clause. He can, however,
protect himself by specifically defining the performance he ex-
pects of the debtor. The trustee must then perform accord-
ingly.32 For example, the royalty payments in franchise
agreements and the rental payments in commercial leases
often are set as a percentage of gross sales. 33 Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the franchisor or lessor could use a bankruptcy
clause to protect himself against a decline in royalty payments
or rentals caused by reduced sales under the trustee's opera-
tion. Under the Code, the franchisor or lessor can protect him-
self by including an option to terminate the agreement if gross
sales fall below a certain level,34 or by setting royalty payments
at the greater of a fixed amount or a percentage of sales.
A contracting party who cannot specifically define the per-
formance he expects of the debtor can protect himself against
the trustee's performance by including clauses that allow him
The Enforceability of Lease Forfeiture-Upon-Bankruptcy Covenants: A Propo-
sal for Damages as an Alternative Remedy, 49 S. CAT. L REv. 339, 363 n.8
(1976).
31. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6304-95; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5845.
32. See text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
33. This particular contractual arrangement was singled out in the House
Report as one in which specified performance requirements would have to be
considered by the court "in order to assure a landlord of his bargained for ex-
change." HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6305.
34. An illustration of such an option can be found in the franchise agree-
ment quoted in note 24 supra, which included a clause giving the licensor an
option to terminate "[s]hould the gross sales (upon which royalties are com-
puted) . . . be less than $200,000 during any calendar year commencing after
the first year of operation." 1A J. RAB'IN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 24, Form
3.45, 1 17(e), at 3-2011.
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to terminate whenever bankruptcy is imminent.35 If he polices
his agreements and terminates them before the commence-
ment of a case, there will be nothing left for the trustee to as-
sume.3 6 A nonbankrupt party who fails to terminate his
agreement with the debtor before bankruptcy and who does
not want to accept the trustee's performance must convince the
court that the trustee will not produce the benefit of the
nonbankrupt party's bargain with the debtor.
C. NONDELEGABLE CONTRACTS AND LEASES
Although a nonbankrupt party cannot prevent the trustee's
assumption or assignment after bankruptcy through a contract
or lease clause, applicable law can prevent the trustee's as-
sumption. Under section 365(c) (1) of the Code, the trustee
cannot assume or assign a contract or lease if: (a) applicable
law excuses the nonbankrupt party from accepting perform-
ance from or rendering performance to the trustee or an as-
signee, regardless of whether the contract or lease restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and (b) the
nonbankrupt party does not consent to the assumption or as-
signment of the agreement. This Article will refer to contracts
and leases that the trustee cannot assume under section
365(c) (1) as "nondelegable."3 7
A contract for the performance of unique personal services
is a nondelegable contract. Assume that a distinguished author
contracts to write a book for a publisher, with payment due
when the author submits his manuscript. If the author goes
bankrupt before completing the manuscript, the trustee will
not be able to assume or assign the contract. All writers do not
"write dramas like Shakespeare or fiction like Dickens. Rare
genius and extraordinary skill are not transferable, and con-
tracts for their employment are therefore personal, and cannot
35. For example, the commodity futures contracts in Allan v. Archer-Dan-
iels-Midland Co. (In re Commodity Merchants, Inc.) included the following
clause:
If Buyer's financial condition is found to be or becomes unsatisfactory
to Seller during the term of this contract, Seller may terminate this
contract and may also terminate all other contracts covering purchase
by Buyer of Seller's products whether or not Buyer may otherwise be
in default, and no rights shall accrue to Buyer against Seller on ac-
count of such termination.
538 F.2d at 1262 n.1, discussed at text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
37. Nondelegable contracts are also known as "'personal contracts,' a label
which may be unfortunate and misleading." Countryman, Executory Contracts




The corn contract between B and S may also be nondelega-
ble. Assume that while the contract is executory, S discovers
that B is insolvent. Under section 2-702(1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, S can refuse delivery of the corn unless B pays
cash.3 9 If B files for bankruptcy and the trustee wants to as-
sume the contract, S-can still refuse delivery if the trustee will
not pay cash. Section 2-702(1) is applicable law that, under sec-
tion 365(c) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code, bars the trustee from
compelling S to perform.
Whether section 2-609 of the U.C.C. would also be applica-
ble law is a more complex question.4° Section 2-609 gives a
party to a contract who has reasonable grounds for insecurity
about the other party's performance a right to demand "ade-
quate assurance of due performance." 41 If the other party does
not provide such assurance in thirty days, the party seeking as-
surance may treat the contract as terminated.42 Assume that in
the corn contract example, B's bankruptcy would give S rea-
sonable ground for insecurity and that the trustee does not re-
spond to S's demand for adequate assurance of performance.
Section 2-609 (4) deems the trustee's failure to assure a repudia-
tion of the contract. This repudiation excuses S from rendering
performance to the trustee, and section 365(c) (1) of the Bank-
38. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240, 247 (1866), quoted in 4 A. CoBmI, CON-
TRACTS § 865, at 436 n.2 (1951).
39. "Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse
delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered
under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705)." U.C.C.
§ 2-702(1).
40. (1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that
the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be im-
paired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to
the performance of either party the other may in writing demand ade-
quate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assur-
ance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for
which he has not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecu-
rity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined ac-
cording to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not
prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of
future performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due per-
formance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case
is a repudiation of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-609.
41. Id. For a definition of adequate assurance of performance, see text ac-
companying notes 61-67 infra.
42. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1976).
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ruptcy Code prevents the trustee's assumption of the corn con-
tract without S's consent.4 3
But sections 365(b) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code under-
cut this argument. In those sections, Congress required that
adequate assurance of performance be provided if the trustee
assumes a contract in which there had been a default 44 or if the
trustee assigns any contract.45 Since Congress did not ex-
pressly require the trustee to provide adequate assurance of
performance for those contracts in which there is neither de-
fault nor assignment, perhaps Congress did not intend that sec-
tion 365(c) would incorporate section 2-609 of the U.C.C. in such
situations.48
Section 365(c) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
trustee cannot assume a "contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the
benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor."47
Congress added this restriction on the trustee's power after
several suggestions during the hearings that it was necessary
"to preclude the preposterous situation of lending institutions
being required to make loans to a bankrupt."48  Section
365 (c) (2) does not prevent the trustee from assuming contracts
to deliver equipment to the debtor, ordinary leases, or contracts
to provide goods or services with payments to be made over
time.4 9
43. The Bankruptcy Commission stated in its proposed draft that U.C.C.
§3 2-609 and 2-702 would be enforceable in liquidation, because applicable law
could modify the debtor's contractual rights because of insolvency. These sec-
tions would not, however, be enforceable in rehabilitation cases, because appli-
cable law cannot modify the debtor's contractual rights in such cases.
BANxRuprcy COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, pt. II, at 156. This statement,
however, carries no force since the enacted version of section 365 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code differs, in this context, from the Commission's bill.
44. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (1).
45. Id. § 365(f)(2)(B).
46. Professor Countryman concluded that, under the Bankruptcy Act,
bankruptcy alone should not trigger U.C.C. § 2-609. Countryman, supra note 37,
at 519-21. As indicated in the text, sections 365(b) and (f) support a similar in-
terpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. U.C.C. § 2-609 was designed to meet the
problem of anticipatory breach in "sales agreements looking to future perform-
ance." U.C.C. § 2-609, Official Comment 2. Sections 365(b) and (f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, if they preclude application of U.C.C. § 2-609 in bankruptcy, also
preclude any claim that bankruptcy alone is an anticipatory breach of a con-
tract to which the U.C.C. does not apply.
47. Bankruptcy Code § 365(c) (2).
48. Hearings on S. 2266 & HR. 8200, supra note 1, at 576 (statement of Rob-
ert J. Grimmig).
49. See Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note 1, at H11093, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6436, 6446; Statement of Sen. DeConcini,
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D. CONTRACTS AND LEASES IN WHICH THERE HAS BEEN A
DEFAULT
Section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee
to fulfill three conditions before he can assume a contract or
lease in which there has been a default:
(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such con-
tract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or
lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to
such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party
resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performances
under such contract or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default
that is a breach of a provision relating to-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any
time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a
case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.5 0
A default is, generally, a breach of a contract provision.51 For
the purposes of this Article, a "financial" default is a breach of
a type described in section 365(b) (2).
The nondebtor party to a contract can terminate the agree-
ment before bankruptcy because of a financial default.52 Sec-
tion 365(e) (1) applies only after bankruptcy to preclude
termination or modification of a contract because of a financial
default.53 If a financial default occurs before bankruptcy and
does not lead to termination, or if a financial default occurs af-
ter bankruptcy, the trustee does not, under section 365(b) (1),
have to cure the default or compensate the nondebtor for
losses caused by the default.5 4
A nonfinancial default before bankruptcy can terminate a
supra note 1, at S17409, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6505,
6515.
50. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b).
51. See Bass v. Foster, 476 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Ky. 1972); Dobitz v. Oakland,
172 Mont. 126, 129, 561 P.2d 441, 442 (1977).
52. See, e.g., Allan v. Archer-Daniels-Midiand Co. (In re Commodity
Merchants, Inc.), 538 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 17-20 supra. Of course, any prebankruptcy termination could be a fraud-
ulent transfer. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
54. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (1).
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contract.55 In many cases, however, a prebankruptcy nonfinan-
cial default will not lead to a formal termination valid under
state law. When the trustee attempts to assume the contract in
such a case, he may, in addition to meeting the requirements of
section 365(b) (1), have to overcome the argument that the con-
tract is no longer executory because the prebankruptcy default
was such a total breach that it suspended the nondebtor's obli-
gation to perform. Because of the debtor's default, the
nondebtor's failure to perform further would not be a material
breach. Professor Countryman defined an executory contract
as one in which the failure of either party to perform further
would be a material breach 5 6 Under that definition, this con-
tract would not be executory. The trustee, therefore, would not
be able to assume the contract, because section 365(a) only al-
lows assumption of executory contracts. This argument applies
the definition of executory contracts out of context. Professor
Countryman's definition serves to distinguish executory con-
tracts from claims of, or against, the estate.5 7
In deciding whether the trustee can assume a contract in
which there has been a prebankruptcy material breach that did
not lead to termination, a simple definition of executory con-
tracts is not relevant. The balance that Congress struck be-
tween the rights of the nondebtor and those of the trustee is
relevant. Section 365(b)(1) sets forth specific requirements
that the trustee must meet in order to assume a contract in
which there has been a nonfinancial default. The subsection
apparently applies to prebankruptcy nonfinancial defaults.58
Section 365 (b) (1) also ensures that the nonbankrupt party will
receive his expected return under the contract and that the
nondebtor, as well as third parties, will receive compensation
for pecuniary losses caused by the debtor's default. Congress
recognized that the trustee would not always be able to com-
pensate the nondebtor, and it is safe to assume that in these
cases Congress intended to preclude the trustee's assumption
of the contract.5 9 The full provision under section 365(b) (1) for
55. See, e.g., Darby v. Atkinson (In re Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33 (Wi). Okla.
1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
56. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MuiN.
L. REv. 439, 460 (1973).
57. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
58. Compare Bankruptcy Code §365(b)(1) with Bankruptcy Code
§ 365(e) (1). Section 365(e) (1) expressly applies only after commencement of
bankruptcy.
59. 'Where the rights of third parties are concerned, such as in the case of
lease premises which have been rerented to a third party, it is not intended
1980]
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the rights of the nondebtor and third parties to an un-
terminated contract on which the debtor has defaulted indi-
cates that Congress did not intend a severe default amounting
to a material breach to preclude the trustee's assumption of the
contract.
To assume a contract in which there has been a nonfman-
cial default, under section 365(b) (1), the trustee must cure the
default and compensate pecuniary losses caused by the default.
Generally, this will be straightforward. If the debtor has
missed one rent installment, the trustee can cure by paying
that installment. If the landlord accelerates the remaining rent
due under the lease before bankruptcy is filed, the trustee still
only has to pay the one installment in order to assume the
lease. Nonpayment of this installment was the debtor's only
default. The landlord cannot maintain that the accelerated rent
is compensation for pecuniary losses caused by the default.
The trustee upon assumption will not be forced to pay the ac-
celerated rent as an obligation of the debtor. Such a result
would entirely vitiate the limitation on compensation for pecu-
niary losses.60
Rather than cure defaults and compensate losses caused
by defaults, the trustee may instead provide adequate assur-
ance of cure and compensation. The trustee must also provide
adequate assurance of future performance. The discussion be-
low will focus on the meaning of adequate assurance of future
performance, but it should also help to clarify the meanings of
adequate assurance of cure and compensation.
Congress has indicated that it imposed the requirement of
adequate assurance "to insure that the trustee's performance
under the contract of lease gives the other contracting party
the full benefit of his bargain."6 1 The Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States adopted the phrase "adequate
that there will be adequate damages to compensate the third party." State-
ment of Rep. Edwards, supra note 1, at H11103, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 6436, 6472; Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra note 1, at
S17420, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6505, 6541.
60. Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 1124(2) (allowing the trustee to reverse acceler-
ation of a claim by reinstating its maturity if the plan cures any nonfinancial
default and compensates for damages caused by the default).
61. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6304-05; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5845. Although the quoted text does
not directly refer to the adequate assurance language of section 365(b) (1), the
House Report continues with a discussion of the bargain made by a shopping
center lessor, and with the definition of adequate assurance for a shopping
center lease under section 365(b) (3).
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assurance of future performance" from section 2-609 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.62 The Commission stated:
What constitutes . . . "adequate assurance of future performance"
must be determined by consideration of the facts of the proposed as-
sumption. Cf. Official Comment 4 to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-609
(1972 ed.). It is not intended, however, that any nondebtor party
should acquire greater rights in a case under the Act than he has
outside the ActY'
The meaning of "adequate assurance of due performance"
in section 2-609 of the U.C.C. should approximate the meaning
of "adequate assurance of future performance" in section
365(b) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code. In section 2-609 of the
U.C.C., one party demands adequate assurance of performance
because he does not want to perform until he is reasonably cer-
tain that the other party will perform. In section 365(b) (1) of
the Bankruptcy Code, the nonbankrupt party is uncertain
whether the trustee will perform a contract in which there has
already been a default, and he does not want to perform with-
out being reasonably certain that the trustee will fully perform
after assumption.
Official Comment 4 to section 2-609 of the U.C.C. provides
an example of adequate assurance of performance in a case
prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Fasola.64 The Corn Products Refining Company de-
manded security that Fasola would pay for goods he had or-
dered, after he failed to pay soon enough to qualify for an early
discount, for which he had qualified in all prior transactions.
Fasola sent a good credit report from his banker and said he
would make the payments when they were due. This, accord-
ing to the Comment, was adequate assurance of performance.
A trustee who showed the court that he had adequate cash to
pay a supplier and promised to pay the supplier could cite Corn
Products Refining Co. and Official Comment 4 to support his
assertion that he had furnished adequate assurance of perform-
ance under section 365(b) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Other cases decided under section 2-609 of the U.C.C. indi-
cate that adequate assurance of performance can require a de-
posit in escrow to secure payment, 65 a set of quantitative
performance standards,66 or a certificate from a third party as-
62. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, pt. I1, at 156.
63. Id. at 156-57.
64. 94 N.J.L. 181, 109 A. 505 (1920).
65. See, e.g., Kunian v. Development Corp., 165 Conn. 300, 312, 334 A.2d 427,
433 (1973) (deposit in escrow required after buyer repeatedly broke promises to
pay for deliveries).
66. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.
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suring the contracting party's performance. 67
The parties to a contract can also define adequate assur-
ance of performance in advance for the purposes of section 2-
609.68 For example, the court in Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v.
Continental Forest Products, Inc.,69 held that the parties had
contractually stipulated that a guarantee of payment would be
adequate assurance of performance. This result suggests that
contracting parties may be allowed to define adequate assur-
ance in order to minimize the chance that a bankruptcy court
will apply what the parties view as an inaccurate definition of
adequate assurance. This contractual definition of adequate as-
surance could be used under section 2-609 if bankruptcy did not
occur, under section 2-609 applied to the trustee through sec-
tion 365(c) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code, or under section
365(b) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code. But a contractual definition
of adequate assurance for the purpose of section 365(b) (1)
might fall within section 365(e) (1), which voids any provision
that modifies a contract or lease because of the debtor's
financial position.70 Even if a contract definition would not
bind a court, many courts may respect a definition of adequate
assurance agreed upon in advance by contracting parties with
equal bargaining power.
In section 365(b) (3), the Bankruptcy Code expressly de-
fines adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of
real property in a shopping center:
For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this section, adequate assurance
of future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center
includes adequate assurance-
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under
such lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not
decline substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not
1976) (adequate assurance of performance of computerized cash registers for
"fast food" restaurants defined as promises of certain failure rates, downtimes,
and service costs for the registers).
67. See, e.g., Appeal of Productions Unlimited, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 620, 627
(Veterans Admin. Contract App. Bd. No. 541, Mar. 11, 1966) (adequate assur-
ance of contract provisions that films licensed to Veterans Administration not
be shown on television over the period of the license required a certificate to
that effect from the holder of the television rights). See also Note, A Right to
Adequate Assurance of Performance in All Transactions: U.C.C. §2-609 Beyond
Sales of Goods, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1358, 1369-72 (1975).
68. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3); Taylor, The Impact of Article 2 of the U.C.C. on the
Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 9 B.C. INDus. & CoM. IL REV. 917, 925
(1968).
69. 261 Or. 480, 495 P.2d 744 (1972).
70. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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breach substantially any provision, such as a radius, location, use,
or exclusivity provision, in any other lease, financing agreement, or
master agreement relating to such shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not dis-
rupt substantially any tenant mix or balance in such shopping
center.71
The House Report stated.
A shopping center is often a carefully planned enterprise, and though it
consists of numerous individual tenants, the center is planned as a sin-
gle unit, often subject to a master lease or financing agreement. Under
these agreements, the tenant mix in a shopping center may be as im-
portant to the lessor as the actual promised rental payments, because
certain mixes will attract higher patronage of the stores in the center,
and thus a higher rental for the landlord from those stores that are
subject to a percentage of gross receipts rental agreement.72
Congress specifically defined adequate assurance of future per-
formance of a shopping center lease in which there has been a
nonfinancial default, but it entrusted the courts with the defini-
tion of adequate assurance of the performance of contracts and
other leases. As indicated above, the unenforceability of bank-
ruptcy clauses requires the court to ensure that the trustee, af-
ter assumption, will provide the nonbankrupt party with the
benefit of his bargain.73 The complexity of shopping center
leases and the risk that, because of that complexity, courts
might not ensure the nonbankrupt lessor the benefit of his bar-
gain, led Congress to enumerate the factors constituting ade-
quate assurance of performance of a shopping center lease.74
The several requests in the hearings for special protection for
shopping center lessors75 and the abundance of shopping cen-
ters may also have contributed to Congress' enactment of sec-
tion 365(b) (3).76
The House Report defined a shopping center as a carefully
planned retail enterprise that functions as a single unit even
though it has numerous individual tenants.7 7 Consider a thirty-
71. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b)(3).
72. HIR REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6305. See Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200, supra note 1,
at 723 (statement of Sylvan VL Cohen) (A shopping center is "'a group of retail
stores and related business facilities, the whole planned, developed, operated,
and managed as a unit'") (source not cited).
73. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
74. See MR. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348-49, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6305.
75. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200, supra note 1, at 706 (state-
ment of Edward J. Kulik); id. at 726 (statement of Sylvan M. Cohen); Hearings
on HR. 31 & H.R. 32, supra note 1, pt. II, at 1853-54.
76. See generally Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200, supra note 1, at 723
(statement of Sylvan M. Cohen) (In 1976, 17,523 shopping centers accounted for
36% of all retail trade.).
77. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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story office building with the ground floor leased by a number
of retail stores and the upper floors leased by a variety of firms
for business offices. If an office supply company defaults on its
lease of a bottom floor store and then files for bankruptcy, the
trustee may have to meet the rigid requirements of section
365(b) (3) before he can assume the lease. In order to impose
those requirements on the trustee, the lessor must take the po-
sition that the bottom floor of the office building is a shopping
center because it consists of numerous retail stores that func-
tion together as a unit to provide services and supplies for the
tenants on the upper floors. The trustee, however, can argue
that the office supply store is not in a shopping center. The
Senate Report, discussing a predecessor of section 365(b)(3),
distinguished between "lease situations common to shopping
centers" and "office building situation [s]," stating that "protec-
tion for [the] tenant mix will not be required in the office build-
ing situation. 7 8 Furthermore, the bottom floor does not
function as an independent unit, but only as a component part
of the building. This example suggests that the trustee may
frequently litigate the definition of "shopping center."
E. CONTRACTS AND LEASES THAT THE TRUSTEE INTENDS TO
ASSIGN AFTER ASSUMPTION
Section 365(f) (1) invalidates provisions in executory con-
tracts, unexpired leases, and applicable law that prohibit, re-
strict, or condition assignment. Subsection (2) provides that
the trustee can assign an executory contract or unexpired lease
only if he assumes in accordance with the provisions of section
365 and if adequate assurance of future performance of the con-
tract or lease "is provided." Section 365(f) (3) states that con-
tracts and leases cannot be terminated or modified by
contractual provisions or by applicable law because of assump-
tion or assignment by the trustee.7 9
78. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5845.
79. Section 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwith-
standing a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the
assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such con-
tract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor only if-
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance
with the provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the as-
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Under section 365(c) (1), a trustee cannot assume certain
executory contracts and unexpired leases because applicable
law excuses the nonbankrupt party from rendering perform-
ance to or receiving performance from the trustee. Section
365(f) (2) (A) requires the trustee to assume an executory con-
signee of such contract or lease is provided, whether or not there
has been a default in such contract or lease.
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or
modifies, or permits a party other than the debtor to terminate or mod-
ify, such contract or lease or a right or obligation under such contract
or lease on account of an assignment of such contract or lease, such
contract, lease, right, or obligation may be terminated or modified
under such provision because of the assumption or assignment of such
contract or lease by the trustee.
Section 365(f) (3), perhaps the most confusing paragraph of this section, ap-
pears to add nothing to section 365(f) (1). Any clause that terminates or modi-
fies a contract or lease because of the trustee's assignment effectively prohibits
assignment. Although section 365(f) (1) is subject to the restrictions of section
365(c), section 365(f) (3) is not.
Section 365(f) (3) also appears to conflict with section 365(c). Paragraph
(3) states that no executory contract or unexpired lease may be terminated or
modified because of a provision in applicable law that allows or provides for
termination or modification upon assumption or assignment. Under section
365(c), however, the trustee cannot assume if applicable law excuses the
nonbankrupt party from rendering performance. In certain situations, section
365(c) may therefore operate to nullify section 365(f) (3). Applicable law can-
not terminate the contract or lease because of section 365(f) (3). Section 365(c),
however, prevents the trustee from assuming certain contracts, and if he can-
not assume, termination of the contract is irrevelant to the trustee.
This interpretation of the relationship between sections 365(c) and
365(f)(3) could completely undercut Congress' purpose in enacting section
365(f). Assume the landlords in a state convince their legislature to pass a law
that provides that no lease can be assigned without the consent of the landlord.
A landlord whose lease the trustee wants to assume can claim that his lease is
nondelegable under section 365(c) and that, therefore, the trustee cannot as-
sume it. This area of the law needs clarification, perhaps through a technical
amendment reconciling sections 365(c) and 365(f) (3), to prevent frustration of
the policy embodied in section 365(f) (3). In this hypothetical context, the court
can enforce the policy behind section 365(f) (3) by exercising its equitable pow-
ers to override section 365(c).
The Congressional Record contains an obscure statement that does little to
resolve this controversy:
Section 365(f) is derived from H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. Dele-
tion of language in section 365(f) (3) of the Senate amendment [S. 2266]
is done as a matter of style. Restrictions with respect to assignment of
an executory contract or unexpired lease are superfluous since the
debtor may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor only if such contract is first assumed under section 365(f) (2) (A)
of the House amendment.
Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra note 1, at S17410, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6505, 6515-16; Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note
1, at H11093, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6447. One
might infer from this statement that Congress intended to delete section
365(f) (3) from the Code. But Congress did not delete it. Furthermore, section
365 (f) is the same in the Code, in H.R. 8200, and in S. 2266.
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tract or unexpired lease in accordance with the other provi-
sions of section 365 before assigning it. The trustee, therefore,
cannot assign any executory contract or unexpired lease that
he cannot assume under section 365(c) (1). The trustee cannot
assign an executory contract to make a loan because section
365(c) (2) forbids the assumption of such a contract. Nor can
the trustee assign a contract that he did not assume within the
time limits set by section 365(d).80 Furthermore, if there has
been a nonfinancial default in an executory contract or
unexpired lease, the trustee cannot assign without first curing
the default, compensating the nonbankrupt party for any actual
pecuniary loss caused by the default, and providing adequate
assurance of future performance. 81
Even if there has not been a default in an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease, the trustee can assign only if "ade-
quate assurance of future performance by the assignee ... is
provided."82 By using the passive voice, the statute fails to
make clear whether the trustee or the assignee must provide
adequate assurance. Section 365(k) of the Bankruptcy Code,
however, clearly relieves the trustee and the estate from any li-
ability for a breach occurring after the assignment of a contract
or lease.83 Thus, if the court allows assignment of an executory
contract or unexpired lease, the trustee and the estate are free
from liability for any breach by the assignee, regardless of
whether the court relied on assurance of performance from the
trustee or the assignee.
The legislative history of the Code does not speak to the
definition of "adequate assurance of future performance" in
section 365(f). The definition should generally be the same as
in section 365(b).84 The definition of adequate assurance of fu-
ture performance of a lease of real property in a shopping
80. Section 365 (d) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60
days after the order for relie or within such additional time as the
court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or
lease is deemed rejected.
For further discussion of section 365(d), see text accompanying notes 99-103 in-fra.
81. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (1). See text accompanying notes 50-70
supra.
82. Bankruptcy Code § 365(f) (2) (B).
83. Section 365(k) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "Assignment by the
trustee to an entity of a contract or lease assumed under this section relieves
the trustee and the estate from any liability for any breach of such contract or
lease occurring after such assignment."
84. See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra.
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center, provided in section 365(b) (3), however, does not ex-
pressly apply to an assignment of such a lease when there has
not been a default.85
The Bankruptcy Act, in section 70(b), invalidated only gen-
eral lease provisions restricting assignment.86 Express lease
provisions restricting assignment and all executory contract
provisions, express or general, restricting assignment were
valid. Section 70(b) allowed contracting parties to protect
themselves against the trustee's imposition of an undesirable
assignee. At the same time, it often frustrated the trustee's at-
tempts to acquire for the estate the benefit of the debtor's good
bargain.87
The extent to which parties will be able to protect them-
selves against undesirable assignees under current law will de-
pend on how the courts balance the conflicting dictates of
section 365(f): adequate assurance of future performance must
be provided and provisions restricting assignment are invalid.
Consider again the thirty-story office building with its bottom
floor leased to a number of retail establishments that will serve
the needs of the tenants of the upper floors.88 Assume that in
each retail lease a clause provides that the tenant must operate
a particular type of business. One tenant, the office supply
company, goes bankrupt without defaulting on its lease. If the
trustee assigns the lease to an office supply company, the les-
sor has no complaint. But assume the trustee cannot find any
potential assignee other than a massage parlor. The lessor
fears that having a massage parlor as a highly visible tenant
will offend the other tenants and reduce the rental value of the
building. Accordingly, he moves to block the trustee's assign-
ment.
The lessor should first attempt to convince the court that
the office supply company occupied a store in a shopping
center.89 If the lessor succeeds with that argument, he must
85. See generally text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
86. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY 70.43 (14th ed. 1978).
87. Reconsider the executory contract for the sale of corn discussed in the
text following note 29 supra. Assume that this contract had a clause providing
for termination upon assignment as well as a bankruptcy clause. Section
365(b) invalidates the bankruptcy clause, and section 365(f) (1) invalidates the
antiassignment clause. Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can as-
sume and then assign the contract to preserve for the estate the benefit of the
debtor's good bargain. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee could have
neither assumed nor assigned the contract.




then convince the court that the section 365(b) (3) definition of
adequate assurance of performance of a shopping center lease
in which there has been a default also applies to the adequate
assurance called for by section 365(f) (2) (B) in the absence of a
default.90 The court, if it accepts both of the lessor's argu-
ments, will prohibit the trustee's assignment to the massage
parlor because it would "disrupt substantially [the] tenant mix
[of the] shopping center."91
If the court holds that the office supply company is not in a
shopping center despite the fact that it occupies the building's
ground floor along with a number of other retail establish-
ments, the lessor must argue that the operation of an office
supply company is an element of performance in the lease, and
that he is therefore due adequate assurance of performance of
that portion of the lease obligation. To this argument the
trustee has two responses. First, the lessor is seeking to pro-
tect his tenant mix with the lease provision, and the Code does
not require the court to provide such protection.92 Second, the
lease provision restricting the use of the premises to office sup-
ply companies invalidly conditions assignment under section
365(f) (1) in the same manner as would a provision allowing as-
signment only to an office supply company.
The trustee has the stronger position here. The lessor of
the office building, however, could protect himself from unde-
sirable assignees by drafting his leases and monitoring his ten-
ants' operations so that he could terminate a lease when a
tenant's bankruptcy was imminent. This scheme would leave
nothing for the trustee to assume or assign.93 Of course, this
would not be a practical solution for many lessors; but if
enough landlords were to terminate leases before their tenants
went bankrupt, Congress might change the law to allow reason-
able restrictions on assignments to provide landlords with
some protection against undesirable assignees. Moreover,
landlords could argue to courts that interpreting the Code to in-
validate lease provisions like the one in the example would en-
courage prebankruptcy terminations, thereby forcing
financially insecure tenants into bankruptcy.
90. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
91. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (3) (D).
92. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra (discussing prebankruptcy
termination of executory contracts and unexpired leases that does not run
afoul of the invalidation of bankruptcy clauses in section 365(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code). See also text accompanying notes 21-23 supra (discussing when
a prebankruptcy lease termination amounts to a fraudulent transfer).
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III. THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED
LEASES
A. CONTRACTS AND LEASES THAT THE TRUSTEE HAS NOT
ASSUMED OR REJECTED
1. Preservation of the Status Quo While the Trustee Decides
Whether to Assume or Reject
The trustee will usually take some time after his appoint-
ment to decide which of the debtor's executory contracts and
unexpired leases he should reject because they are burden-
some to the estate and which he should assume because they
will benefit the estate. While the trustee is deciding whether to
assume a contract or lease, the nondebtor party may attempt to
terminate the agreement to prevent the trustee's assumption.
The provision for an automatic stay in section 362(a)9 4 of the
Bankruptcy Code will prevent any immediate, ex parte termi-
nation of a contract or lease by the nondebtor party. Under
section 362(d), however, the nondebtor party can seek relief
from the stay, to allow it to terminate the contract or lease.95 In
this context, the court should consider that one reason Con-
gress singled out executory contracts and unexpired leases for
special treatment in section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act was to
ensure that the nondebtor would know within a limited time
whether the trustee would assume and compel his perform-
ance.96 The court should preserve the status quo between the
trustee and the nondebtor for a reasonable time to give the
trustee an opportunity to decide whether to assume or reject
94. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "a petition fied
under ... this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... (3) any
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the es-
tate." An executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor is property of the
estate. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. See also Darby v. Atkinson (In
re Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.). Okla. 1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 21-23 supra. Termination of a contract or lease of the debtor, therefore, is
an act to "obtain possession of property of the estate."
95. Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of
this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or condition-
ing such stay-
(2) with repect to a stay of an act against property, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion.
96. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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an executory contract or unexpired lease.97 The trustee's right
to a reasonable time for decision is "paramount to the other
party's right... to claim a forfeiture, as in a lease, because of
nonperformance by the trustee."98
In liquidation cases, the Code defines sixty days after the
order for relief as the reasonable time within which the trustee
must decide to assume or reject.99 The court, for cause, can ex-
tend the sixty-day period to give the trustee additional time to
decide. 00 If the trustee's assumption of an executory contract
or unexpired lease is not timely, section 365(d) (1) deems the
contract or lease rejected.
Section 365(d) (2) does not specify a time within which the
trustee must assume a contract or lease in cases arising under
chapters 9, 11, or 13.101 It does, however, allow the court, "on
request of any party to [a] contract or lease, [to] order the
trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether
to assume or reject.'u0 2 The legislative history explains, 'This
provision will prevent parties in contractual or lease relation-
ships with the debtor from being left in doubt concerning their
status vis-a-vis the estate."' 03 The courts may not always be
able to effect the intent of Congress expressed in this quote.
Consider, for example, a debtor who operates a chain of super-
markets on leased property in several states. When the debtor
files for rehabilitation, several creditors that have made large
loans to the debtor insist that it limit its operations to one
state. The debtor wants to continue its widespread operations.
97. See Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 151 (1946).
98. Bradshaw v. Loveless (In re American Nat'l Trust), 426 F.2d 1059, 1064
(7th Cir. 1970) (quoting 6 COLLIER ON BAxxu'rcuy ] 3.23, at 576-80 (14th ed.
1978)).
99. Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(1), quoted in note 80 supra.
100. Id.
101. Section 365(d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
In a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume
or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor at any
time before the confirmation of a plan, but the court, on request of any
party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine
within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such con-
tract or lease.
See also Bankruptcy Code §§ 1123(b) (2), 1322(b) (7) (allowing the plan of reor-
ganization to provide for the assumption or rejection of an executory contract
or unexpired lease that the trustee has not previously rejected under section
365).
102. Id. §365(d) (2).
103. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 348, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE




For the possibly lengthy time during which the debtor and the
creditors wrangle over the plan, the lessors of the supermar-
kets that the debtor may have to abandon under the plan will
not know whether the debtor will assume or reject their
leases.1o4
As discussed above, the nondebtor party to a contract or
lease may attempt to terminate under a default clause while
the trustee, or debtor in possession, decides whether to assume
or reject. 05 Several cases have explored the powers of the
court to preserve the status quo during the trustee's decision
period.
In P.M.G. Corp. v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Investment
Corp.), 0 6 the debtor filed for reorganization on April 1, 1974.
On June 28, the trustee successfully moved for a postponement
of the decision on the assumption of an executory land sale
contract to give his deputy time to evaluate the contract. The
trustee failed to make the installment payment due under the
contract on July 1 and, on August 1, the nondebtor party pur-
ported to terminate the contract under a default clause al-
lowing termination after a failure to pay for thirty days. The
court denied the nondebtor party the benefit of the default
clause and later allowed the trustee to assume the contract.
The court stated that it had "the power to preserve the status
quo while the trustee is utilizing the reasonable period of time
to make up his mind" whether to assume.107 The value of the
land in P.M.G. Corp. was "apparently rising," 0 8 and the debtor
had already made substantial installment payments. Equity,
therefore, dictated that the nondebtor party should not be al-
lowed to terminate the contract and deny the benefit of the
debtor's good bargain to the estate. The court found that "[t] he
countervailing equities [were] not impaired because if the
trustee decide[d] to adopt the contract, it [would] have to
make the payments it [had] missed with interest."'109
104- See Bankruptcy Code §§ 1101(1), 1107(a) (granting the "debtor in pos-
session" the powers of the trustee, including the power to assume or reject ex-
ecutory contracts and unexpired leases under section 365).
105. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
106. 520 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 743.
108. Id. at 744.
109. Id. The court here requires the trustee to cure the default and com-
pensate the nondebtor for the pecuniary loss caused by the default. The Code
also requires cure of and compensation for defaults before assumption. See




In Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products
Corp.,"0 the nondebtor party granted an exclusive franchise of
an innovative concrete manufacturing process to the debtor.
The license agreement obligated the debtor to pay royalties
and allowed the licensor the option of terminating the agree-
ment sixty days after sending notice to the licensee of its de-
fault in royalty payments. The licensor sent such notice on
November 13, 1970; the debtor filed for bankruptcy on Decem-
ber 8, 1970; and on January 16, 1971, when the default contin-
ued, the nondebtor purportedly terminated the license. More
than four months later, the debtor successfully petitioned the
bankruptcy judge to enjoin the licensor's grant of the debtor's
exclusive franchise to another licensee. The referee stated that
the default would be cured "during an extended period as may
be determined by this Court.""'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
framed one issue as whether "the concededly pervasive author-
ity of the referee permit[ted] him to preserve [the] Debtor's
contractual rights by indefinitely postponing the performance
required by the terms of the contract (i. e. the payment of past
due royalties).1112 The court found that no specific provision of
the Bankruptcy Act empowered the referee to suspend a forfei-
ture provision unilaterally."13 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that loss of the franchise would cause the debtor irreparable in-
jury, but it then stated:
We conclude that this is simply not a case for the invocation of high
equity. [The licensor's] contractual right to terminate the contract
clearly survived both the filing of the arrangement petition and the
[bankruptcy judge's] belated attempt to resurrect an already moribund
agreement. In such circumstances [the] Debtor must live with its for-
feiture.
1 14
P.M.G. Corp. distinguished Schokbeton Industries on the
ground that it did not address the question of restraining for-
feiture for a reasonable, as opposed to an indefinite, period of
time."15 The cases can be distinguished on another ground. In
P.M.G. Corp., the trustee sought to restrain a forfeiture provi-
sion so that he could evaluate the executory contract.1 6 In
Schokbeton Industries, however, there was no suggestion that
the debtor needed time to evaluate the benefit of the license
110. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 174.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 175 n.7.
114. Id. at 177.
115. 520 F.2d at 744.
116. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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agreement to the estate. The debtor based its name and its cor-
porate existence on its license of the Schokbeton concrete pro-
duction process.117 It appears that in Schokbeton Industries the
debtor needed time, not to evaluate the license, but to find cash
to cover the overdue royalty payment. Schokbeton Industries,
therefore, holds that the debtor cannot be excused indefinitely
from contract performance while it seeks the means to perform.
The Bankruptcy Code does not alter this aspect of
Schokbeton Industries. That case also noted that the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not allow a unilateral extension of a forfeiture
provision."18 The Code, however, does permit such an exten-
sion:
[I]f applicable law.., or an agreement fixes a period within which the
debtor... may... cure a default... and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee
may... cure ... before the later of-
(1) the end of such period... ; and
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.119
2. The Trustee's Liability for Benefits Received While He
Decides Whether to Assume or Reject
As indicated earlier, the trustee will usually require some
time to decide whether to assume or reject an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease.120 During this time, the trustee will
often receive some benefit under the unassumed contract or
lease, and the nondebtor may seek to hold the trustee liable for
this benefit.' 2' Assume, for example, that the debtor leases a
clothing store for $1,000 per month, due on the first of each
month. The debtor misses the May rental payment and files for
rehabilitation on May 15. The trustee takes some time to evalu-
ate the lease and finally decides to assume it on July 5. Section
365(b) (1) requires the trustee to cure the defaults in rent pay-
ments, compensate the lessor for pecuniary losses resulting
from the defaults, and provide adequate assurance of future
performance. 122 The Code, like the Bankruptcy Act, does not
expressly provide for the possibility that the trustee will reject
on July 5 after occupying the store for nearly two months. Case
law under the Bankruptcy Act established that the lessor could
117. See 466 F.2d at 174.
118. Id. at 175 n.7.
119. Bankruptcy Code § 108(b).
120. See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
121. In this context, the estate's liability and the trustee's liability are syn-
onymous. The lessor's claim is often said to be for administrative rent.
122. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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claim an administrative expense against the estate for the rea-
sonable value of the property occupied by the trustee under
the unassumed lease.123
In Reisenweber's v. Irving Trust Co. (In re United Cigar
Stores Co.),124 the debtor leased an entire building, operated a
cigar store in a corner on the ground floor, sublet the rest of the
building, and then filed for rehabilitation. The trustee operated
the cigar store and provided some services to and collected
some rent from the subtenants. The trustee eventually rejected
the lease. The court held the trustee liable, in equity, for the
reasonable value of use of the lease and occupation of the cigar
store. The trustee was not liable for the reasonable rental
value of the entire leased premises, because it had merely tried
to maintain the status quo with the subtenants while deciding
whether to reject the lease.125
Generally, courts will deem the rents called for by the
lease reasonable unless some evidence indicates otherwise.126
The trustee is liable only for a reasonable rental of the prem-
ises actually occupied.127 The weight of authority holds that
the trustee is liable for his use and occupancy from the first
date of his occupation, not from the first date after bankruptcy
that a new installment of rent would have been due under the
debtor's lease.128 The clothing store example set forth above il-
lustrates this proposition. After failing to pay the rent due on
May 1, the debtor filed for rehabilitation on May 15, at which
time the trustee immediately occupied the leased premises.
The majority rule holds the trustee liable for his occupation
from May 15. The minority rule holds the trustee liable for his
occupation from June 1, when the debtor's next rent payment
would have been due.
The cases are also split on the question of whether the
123. See, e.g., American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Leonardo
Arrivabene, SJ., 280 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1960).
124. 69 F.2d 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 566 (1934).
125. Id. at 515. Accord, In re Unishops, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd per curiam, 543 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1976) ("occupation by a sublessee
of a debtor is not to be construed as occupation by the debtor in possession").
Cf. Lama Co. v. Union Bank, 315 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that the
trustee occupied the entire premises when he padlocked and nailed it shut to
indicate his possession, even though he had abandoned to a secured creditor
two-thirds of the property stored on the premises).
126. See, e.g., Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Harralson, 369 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.
1966).
127. See 120 Wall Assocs. v. Schilling, 266 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir. 1959).




court should consider the trustee's use of the property in set-
ting the reasonable value of the trustee's occupation. In 120
Wall Associates v. Schilling,129 for example, the Second Circuit
indicated that if the trustee used the debtor's offices for stor-
age, the lessor could recover only the value of the premises as
storage space.130 But in Diversified Services, Inc. v. Harral-
son,131 the Fifth Circuit stated that the administrative rent due
from the trustee should not be affected by the fact that the
trustee used premises for storage that had been occupied previ-
ously by a going business.132
3. The Trustee's Liability for a Lessor's Furnishing of Services
or Supplies Incidental to an Unassumed Lease:
Section 365(b) (4)
A lessor's common law right to administrative rent pro-
vides some compensation for the trustee's use of property
under an unassumed lease. Section 365(b) (4) provides an ad-
ditional, limited right of compensation for affirmative perform-
ance by a lessor under an unassumed lease. If there has been a
nonfinancial default in an unexpired lease of the debtor, "the
trustee may not require a lessor to provide services or supplies
incidental to such lease before assumption of such lease unless
the lessor is compensated under the terms of such lease for
any services and supplies provided under such lease before as-
sumption of such lease."' 33
The meaning of section 365(b) (4) may best be explored
with an example. Assume that the debtor leases a small fleet of
trucks from L. Under the lease, L must maintain the trucks in
safe operating condition, and the debtor must pay $1,000 rental
on the first day of each month. Assume further that the debtor
files a chapter 11 petition on May 29, and the trustee fails to pay
the rent due on June 1. On June 5, the trustee demands that L
repair a truck that just broke down. L refuses to service the
129. 266 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1959).
130. Id. at 550.
131. 369 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1966).
132. Id. at 95. The Bankruptcy Code does not directly address the variation
in the case law under the Bankruptcy Act on the trustee's liability for benefits
received while he decides whether to assume. The automatic stay applies dur-
ing this period, and the analysis of the Code's requirement of adequate protec-
tion for lessors would apply to the issues in these cases. See text
accompanying notes 136-147 infra. The legislative history, unfortunately, does
not indicate Congress' intent in this regard.
133. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (4). For a definition of a financial default,
see text accompanying note 51 supra.
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truck unless the trustee first pays the $1,000 due under the
lease on June 1. The trustee can argue that the $1,000 is not
compensation for services under the terms of the lease, but
rather is the entire compensation; therefore, the trustee can ar-
gue, he may pay L either the component price of service under
the lease or the cost to L of servicing the truck.
The trustee can support his argument by showing that
Congress, in passing section 365(b) (4), did not adopt suggested
amendments that would have prohibited the trustee's use of
leased property before assumption of the lease. 34 It appears
that Congress intended to protect lessors only from further
losses caused by the trustee's need for incidental services or
supplies.135 A court interpreting 365(b) (4) can provide that
protection for lessors by requiring the trustee to pay the les-
sor's cost of providing incidental services or supplies.
4. Special Protection for Lessors: Section 363(e)
Section 363(e) provides that "at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used.., by the trustee,
the court shall prohibit or condition such use ... as is neces-
sary to provide adequate protection of such interest.'1 36 This
section, although originally intended to protect a secured credi-
tor's interest in collateral used by the trustee, 137 is general
enough to apply to a lessor's interest in leased property used
by the trustee.
The unenacted predecessors of section 363(e) expressly
protected lessors whose property was used by the trustee. The
Commission's bill and the Judges' bill'38 both allowed the
trustee to use property leased pursuant to an unassumed lease
134. The counsel for the Car & Truck Renting and Leasing Association
wrote to Senator DeConcini urging amendment of section 365 of S. 2266 so that
the trustee is not entitled to operate the equipment or demand addi-
tional operating supplies under [an unassumed lease] unless and until
he shall have either accepted the lease or shall have given the lessor
adequate assurance against loss on account of such operation or fur-
nishing of additional supplies and services. In other words, although
the benefits of an executory contract are made available to the trustee,
he cannot demand performance by the other party until he himself un-
dertakes to perform the assumed obligations or furnishes assurance to
the other party against frther loss and expense.
Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200, supra note 1, at 882, 884 (emphasis added).
135. See id.
136. Bankruptcy Code § 363(e).
137. See text accompanying note 143 infra.
138. See note 1 supra.
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until termination of the automatic stay.139 Both proposals also
allowed the lessor to apply for termination of the stay for lack
of adequate protection of the lessor's interest. Upon termina-
tion of the stay, the lessor could exercise his right to seize the
leased property.
As indicated above, section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
protects entities with an interest in property used by the
trustee.140 A lessor has an interest in property that he has
leased to the debtor. The definition of that interest will deter-
139. The Commission's bill provided for use of leased property by the
trustee during the automatic stay-
Section 7-203. Use of Property Leased or Subject to a Lien.
(a) Use of Property. Notwithstanding the terms of a lease of personal
property ....
(1) the trustee ... may use... personal property leased pursu-
ant to a lease that has not been assumed, in the operation of
the business of the debtor, until termination of the stay pre-
scribed by section 4-501;...
(b) Relief from or Modification of Stay. Pursuant to the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and section 4-501(c), a secured party or lessor
may file a complaint (1) to terminate the stay, or (2) to modify the stay
by imposing such conditions on the use of the property or the proceeds
thereof as will adequately protect the secured party. The trustee or
debtor shall have the burden of proving that the value of the secured
creditor's interest in the property or the property leased as of the date
of the petition is adequately protected.
Commission's bill, supra note 1, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32,
supra note 1, app., at 242-44. The Judges' bill contained a substantially similar
provision:
Section 4-715. Use of Property Leased or Subject to a Lien.
(a) Use of Property. Nothwithstanding the terms of a lease of prop-
erty or a security agreement, the trustee ... may, until termination of
the stay prescribed by section 4-501, use-
(1) rents and profits of real estate owned or held under lease by
the debtor;
(2) property leased pursuant to a lease that has not been as-
sumed, and
(3) property of the estate subject to a lien, other than the pro-
ceeds of collateral, and may continue to use the proceeds of
collateral upon the filing of an involuntary petition... if no-
tice of the filing of the petition is served upon the secured
party ....
(c) Relief From or Modification of Stay. Pursuant to the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and section 4-501(c), a secured party or lessor
may file a complaint (1) to terminate the stay, or (2) to modify the stay
by imposing such conditions on the use of the property or the proceeds
thereof as will adequately protect the secured party. The trustee or
debtor shall have the burden of proving that the secured creditor's in-
terest in the property or the property leased as of the date of the peti-
tion is adequately protected.
Judges' bill, supra note 1, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra
note 1, app., at 242-44.




mine what protection section 363(e) affords a lessor whose
property the trustee uses before assuming the lease. Once the
trustee assumes a lease, section 363(e) should no longer apply;
the trustee will be bound by the terms of the lease, and the re-
quirements of section 365 should protect the lessor. Section
363(e) may determine the lessor's rights, however, both while
the trustee is deciding whether to assume the lease and if the
trustee rejects the lease after some deliberation.
Reconsider the debtor who leased a fleet of trucks for $1,000
per month, due on the first of each month. When the debtor
files under chapter 11 on May 15, the lessor becomes concerned
that the trustee will not pay the rent due on June 1. The lessor
therefore applies to the court for adequate protection of his in-
terest.141 The lessor's interest in this situation is twofold. First,
he has an interest in the lease itself; i.e., he has a claim for the
rental payments due under the lease. Second, he has an inter-
est in the leased property itself; i.e., he holds title to the leased
property. The court, in providing adequate protection for the
lessor under section 363(e), should consider these interests
separately.
When the lessor asserts a right to be paid the full lease
rentals under an unassumed lease during the automatic stay,142
he seeks payments that the debtor has promised him. In this
regard, he is similar to any other creditor, and section 363(e)
provides him adequate protection of his interest. "Adequate
protection of an interest of an entity in property is intended to
protect a creditor's allowed secured claim.' 43 Even though a
lessor holds title to the leased property, it is generally only his
security deposit that secures his claim for the rent due on that
property. The trustee's use of the leased property will not af-
fect the lessor's security deposit. Thus, his use will not ad-
versely affect the lessor's secured claim for the rent due under
the lease. The section 363(e) requirement of adequate protec-
tion for an entity's interest in property used by the trustee dur-
ing the automatic stay therefore does not encompass the
lessor's interest in receiving the rent due under his lease with
the debtor.
141. The automatic stay in section 362 effectively bars any other action by
the lessor. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 94 supra.
143. Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note 1, at H11092, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6444 (emphasis added); Statement of
Sen. DeConcini, supra note 1, at S17409, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6505, 6513 (emphasis added).
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The lessor, however, has another interest in the leased
property, an interest that section 363(e) does not adequately
protect. The lessor holds title to the leased property that the
trustee uses under an unassumed lease.' 44 Section 361 defines
the means by which the court can provide adequate protection
of the interest of an entity in property. 45 Section 361(1) seems
an appropriate means of protecting a lessor's interests. It calls
for periodic cash payments to the lessor to the extent that the
trustee's use of the leased property decreases the value of that
property. The protection that a court will provide a lessor
under section 361(1) will depend on the facts of each case. The
lessor of the fleet of trucks in the example should receive pay-
ments, not of the lease rentals, but of an amount adequate to
cover the decline in value of the trucks during the period in
which the trustee uses them.
Section 361(1) also requires payments to the lessor to the
extent that the automatic stay under section 362 results in a de-
crease in the value of the lessor's interest in the leased prop-
erty. Assume, for example, that the trustee does not use the
trucks leased from the lessor while he decides whether to as-
144. The remarks of legislative leaders indicate that in a "financial" or "se-
curity" lease,
the lessor has no substantial interest in the leased property at the ex-
piration of the lease term. ... The rental payments in such cases are
in substance payments of principal and interest either on a loan se-
cured by the leased real property or on the purchase of the leased real
property.
Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note 1, at H11094, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6448-49; Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra note
1, at S17410, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6505, 6517. In a
"true" lease, as opposed to a "financial" or "security" lease, the lessor's title
has some value at the end of the lease term.
145. Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364
of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate pro-
tection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to
such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362
of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this ti-
tle, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title re-
sults in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in
such property
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien
to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease or grant re-
sults in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in
such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity
to compensation allowable under section 503(b) (1) of this
title as an administrative expense, as will result in the re-
alization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of
such entity's interest in such property.
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sume the lease. During this period, the lessor will be subject to
the automatic stay. The trustee, in taking time to decide
whether to assume the lease, is proposing, in effect, a possible
future use of the leased property. Section 363(e) therefore al-
lows the lessor to petition the court for protection of its interest
in the leased property.
Assume that the trustee takes two months to decide to re-
ject the lease and that during those months the truck's fair
market value decreases by $800. The lessor is entitled to ade-
quate protection in that amount. If the lessor requests ade-
quate protection under section 363(e), and the protection
provided by the court proves inadequate, then the lessor
should have a section 507(b) "super-priority" to the extent of
the inadequacy. 1 6 In this example, the trustee did not use the
leased property while he was deciding to reject the lease.
Nonetheless, the property declined in value, and the lessor
should recover the amount of that decline if he sought such
protection under section 363(e). This alters the common law
rule that the trustee is liable only for his actual use of the
leased property during the decision period. 147
B. CONTRACTS AND LEASES THAT THE TRUSTEE HAS ASSUMED
"The trustee... may not blow hot and cold. If he accepts
the contract, he accepts it cum onere. If he receives the bene-
fits he must adopt the burdens. He cannot accept one and re-
ject the other."' 4 After assuming a contract or lease, the
trustee must perform in full, as the debtor would have been
bound to perform had bankruptcy not intervened.149 Moreover,
the nonbankrupt party's claim for performance is a cost of pre-
serving the estate entitled to a section 507(a) (1) priority as an
administrative expense.150
The general proposition that the terms of an assumed exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease bind the trustee is subject to
146. Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides ade-
quate protection of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien
on property of the debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such
creditor has a claim... arising from the stay of action [or, inter alia,
use under section 363], then such creditor's claim ... shall have prior-
ity over every other claim ....
147. See text accompanying notes 120-132 supra.
148. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir. 1951).
149. See Vilas & Sommer, Inc. v. Mahony (In re Steelship Corp.), 576 F.2d
128, 132 (8th Cir. 1978).
150. See American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Ar-
rivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1960).
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three exceptions. First, section 108(b) may extend the time
that the trustee has to cure a default. 51 Second, default
clauses do not bind the trustee when he takes a reasonable
time to decide whether to assume. 5 2 Finally, section 365(e) in-
validates provisions that modify contract or lease rights be-
cause of the debtor's financial condition or the commencement
of a bankruptcy case.15 3
C. CONTRACTS AND LEASES THAT THE TRUSTEE HAS REJECTED
Section 365(g) states that "the rejection of an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach
of such contract or lease."'u It does not, however, apply to real
property leases in which the debtor is the lessor, or to install-
ment land sale contracts in which the nondebtor-vendee is in
possession. Sections 365(h) and (i), discussed in part IV of this
Article, govern these leases and contracts.
"The purpose [of section 365(g)] is to treat rejection
claim [s] as prepetition claims."' 55 Under section 365(g) (1), the
breach arising from the trustee's rejection of an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease that has never been assumed occurs
immediately before the filing of the petition. Section 502(g)
provides that:
A claim arising from the rejection . .. of an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be de-
termined, and shall be allowed under... this section or disallowed
under ... this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the
date of the filing of the petition.
1 5 6
Under section 502(a), any claim filed under section 501 is
deemed allowed unless an interested party objects. Section
502(b) requires the court to determine the amount of a claim to
which an objection is made; it also requires disallowance of
some claims or portions of claims on a variety of grounds. 157
151. See Bankruptcy Code § 108(b), quoted in text accompanying note 119
supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 105-117 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
154. Bankruptcy Code § 365(g).
155. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 349, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6305; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 60, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5846.
156. Bankruptcy Code § 502(g).
157. Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
Except as provided in subsections (f), (g), (h) and (i) of this section, if
such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing,
shall determine the amount of such claim as of the date of the filing of
the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the
extent that-
(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor, and unen-
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Under section 502(b) (1), for example, the trustee can have the
court disallow a claim for rejection of an executory contract
that could not have been enforced against the debtor. Section
502(b) (8) limits claims for termination of an employment con-
tract. Section 502(b) (7) limits the allowability of a real prop-
erty lessor's claim for termination of his lease.'5 8 Congress
"designed [section 502(b) (7)] to compensate the landlord for
his loss while not permitting a claim so large... as to prevent
other general unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend
from the estate."' 59
In a chapter 11 or 13 case, and in a chapter 7 case that has
not been converted from another chapter, if the trustee rejects
or breaches a contract that he has assumed, the breach occurs
forceable against property of the debtor, under any agreement or appli-
cable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or
unmatured,
(7) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting
from the termination of a lease of real property, such claim exceeds-
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for
the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of
the remaining term of such lease, following the earlier of-
(i) the date of the filing of the petiton; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the
lessee surrendered, the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without accelera-
tion, on the earlier of such dates;
(8) if such claim is for damages resulting from the termination of
an employment contract, such claim exceeds-
(A) the compensation provided by such contract, without ac-
celeration, for one year following the earlier of-
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which the employer directed the
employee to terminate, or such employee terminated, perform-
ance under such contract; plus
(B) the unpaid compensation due under such contract with-
out acceleration, on the earlier of such dates; ....
158. Assume that L has let premises to the debtor for $1,000 per month
under a 25-year lease. The debtor misses two months' rent and files for bank-
ruptcy when 24 years remain on the lease. The trustee rejects the lease imme-
diately. Section 502(b) (7) places a ceiling on L's claim in bankruptcy equal to
(a) three years' remaining rent or $36,000, plus (b) $2,000. This, however, does
not mean that L has a claim against the estate for $38,000. L has a claim only
for his actual damages from the breach of the lease, up to a maximum of
$38,000.
The section 502(b) (7) limit on a lessor's damages applies only to "true" as
opposed to "financial" leases. Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra note 1, at
S17410, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6505, 6517; Statement
of Rep. Edwards, supra note 1, at H11094, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 6436, 6448. For a definition of "true" and "financial" leases, see note
144 supra.
159. ILR. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 353, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6309; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 63, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5849. See also note 164 infra.
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at the time of rejection.160 In such an instance the nonbank-
rupt party will have an administrative expense claim for the
breach under section 507(a) (1).161
Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the distribu-
tion of the property of the estate in liquidation. It grants prior-
ity to claims under section 507 in the order of their listing in
that section, then to allowed unsecured claims. Section
507 (a) (1) grants a first-level priority to administrative expense
claims such as those arising from the breach of an executory
contract or unexpired lease that the trustee has assumed.162
Section 507(a) (5) establishes a fifth-level priority for claims up
to $900 "arising from the deposit, before the commencement of
the case, of money in connection with the purchase, lease, or
rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the personal,
family, or household use of such individuals, that were not de-
livered or provided."' 63 Assume, for example, that a consumer
places a $200 deposit on a washing machine at an appliance
store. The store subsequently files for bankruptcy, and the
trustee rejects the executory sales contract with the consumer.
The consumer then has only an unsecured prepetition claim
against the estate for his deposit, but section 507(a) (5) gives
that claim priority.164
160. Bankruptcy Code § 365(g) (2) (A). If the trustee assumes an executory
contract or unexpired lease in a chapter 11 or 13 case that is later converted to
a chapter 7 liquidation case, and the trustee, after conversion, rejects the con-
tract or lease, the breach occurs immediately before the conversion. Bank-
ruptcy Code § 365(g) (2) (B) (i). Liability for breach of a contract assumed in a
chapter 11 or 13 case is an expense under those chapters even if the breach
does not occur until after the conversion of the case to liquidation. See J.
TROST, C. KING & M KLEE, THE PROPOSED FEDERAL BANKRu rcY REFORM ACT
157 (1978). Section 726(b) gives priority to the administrative expenses of liqui-
dation over the administrative expenses of the associated preconversion chap-
ter 11 or 13 case. If, after conversion, the trustee assumes an executory
contract or unexpired lease and later rejects it, the breach occurs at the time of
rejection. Bankruptcy Code § 365(g) (2) (B) (ii). Damages from the breach will
then be an administrative expense of liquidation.
161. See 2 COLLER ON BANKRuPTcY 365.03 (15th ed. 1979).
162. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
163. Bankruptcy Code § 507(a) (5).
164. Compare Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 64(a)(5), 52 Stat. 840 (repealed
1978) (Bankruptcy Act) (granting landlords a priority for their rent claims)
with Bankruptcy Code § 507(b) (7) (granting no such priority). See also text
accompanying note 159 supra.
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IV. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CERTAIN REAL
PROPERTY LEASES AND INSTALLMENT LAND
SALE CONTRACTS
A. REAL PROPERTY LEASES IN WHICH THE DEBTOR IS THE
LANDLORD
Section 365(a) expressly limits the trustee's power to reject
executory contracts and unexpired leases only by making the
trustee's rejection "subject to the court's approval." Section
365(h), however, may limit the trustee's power to reject real
property leases in which the debtor is the landlord.165 This sec-
tion can be best understood by first examining the law under
the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provided, "Unless a
lease of real property shall expressly otherwise provide, a re-
jection of such lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee
of the lessor shall not deprive the lessee of his estate.' 66 The
courts occasionally had difficulty interpreting this section. Con-
sider, for example, the comment on section 70(b) in In re Penn
Central Transportation Co.:167
One theory, which has many adherents among the commentators, is
that the lessee's "estate" which is protected is his right of possession,
together with all covenants running with the land in his favor. Imple-
mentation of that theory may involve difficult questions as to what cov-
enants do run with the land, and by what law those issues are to be
decided. Does state law control, does. state law control unless it is ab-
errational and contrary to the goals of federal bankruptcy law, or does
federal bankruptcy law control entirely?168
In In re Penn Central Transportation Co., the trustees for
the bankrupt lessor attempted to disaffirm the lessees' obliga-
tions to pay the rents specified in their leases. The trustees
then wanted to set the rents at current market value and evict
the lessees if they failed to pay the increased rents. The trust-
ees argued that the evictions would be based on breaches of
the modified rental obligations, not on the trustees' disaffirm-
ance.169 The court commented, "Whether an obligation due to
165. Section 365(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides to installment
land sale vendees in possession protection similar to that which section 365(h)
provides real property lessees, may limit the trustee's power to reject such con-
tracts. See text accompanying notes 184-190 infra.
166. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978) (em-
phasis added).
167. 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
168. Id. at 1355. See also Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Lais-
sez les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391, 1434 (1971); Kane & Ruttenberg, The Land-
lord-Tenant Relationship in Bankruptcy, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & Ta. J. 482, 496
(1977).
169. 458 F. Supp. at 1355.
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the Debtor [in this case, rental payments] may be disaffirmed
is an issue which is not definitively resolved by the cases.' 7 0
The court did not expressly hold that the lessees' estate in-
cluded the right to possession at the rent specified in the lease.
Instead, the court stated that equitable considerations pre-
cluded the trustees' disaffirmance of the leases and renegoti-
ation of the rentals:
The lessees are not creditors of the estate, who extended credit and
took the risks of such extensions. There are no burdensome affirmative
covenants. The leases were negotiated at arms length; if they are less
attractive now than they might be, the difference is attributable solely
to changes in the economic climate and not to the Debtor's financial
reverses.
171
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws stated that the
definition of the lessee's estate "remains unclear in the absence
of dispositive judicial construction."'172 The Commission pro-
posed to resolve the uncertainties in the old law by providing in
its bill that "the rejection of a lease under which the debtor is
the lessor constitutes the abandonment of the leased property
to the lessee and not a breach of the lease.'17 3 The Commis-
sion indicated that the trustee could reject any covenant of the
lease, and the lessee would have no claim against the estate.174
The Commission's abandonment approach, however, raised ad-
ditional questions. Would, for example, abandonment be a con-
veyance to the lessee?175
The Judges' bill adopted different and more specific lan-
guage in response to the problem of defining the lessee's estate:
[T]he rejection of a lease under which the debtor is the lessor shall
give the lessee the option of continuing the occupancy of the leased
premises or possession of the leased property, as the case may be,
upon the lessee's payment of the rentals stipulated by the lease agree-
ment to the successor to debtor's interest as lessor; lessee shall have
the further option of performing lessor's defaulted obligations at
lessee's costs and to receive offset credit for those costs against lessee's
stipulated rental payments. 17
6
This rejection of the abandonment approach avoids some of the
170. Id. at 1355 n.7.
171. Id. at 1356.
172. BANInuprcy ComanssIoN REPORT, supra note 1, pt. ]I, at 157.
173. Commission's bill, supra note 1, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 &
H.R. 32, supra note 1, app. § 4-602(c), at 168.
174. See BANKRuprcY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, pt. H, at 157 (Sec-
tion 4-602(c) "obviates the need to distinguish between leased covenants that
are part of the 'estate' of the lease and those that are not .... [T]he lessee
receiving the abandoned property is not permitted a claim for loss of bar-
gain.").
175. See Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra note 1, pt. III, at 1596-97.
176. Judges' bill, supra note 1, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32,
supra note 1, app. § 4-602(c), at 168.
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problems of the Commission's bill. But the Judges' bill, by pro-
viding that rejection "shall give the lessee the option of contin-
uing ... possession of the leased property," raised the
question whether the trustee could reject every lease covenant.
For example, assume that the lease for the fourteenth floor of
an office building provides that the lessor has to furnish eleva-
tor service. The lessee could claim under the Judges' bill that
the trustee could not reject the covenant to provide elevator
service because such a rejection would effectively deny the
lessee his option of continuing possession. 77
This problem carries over into the Code.178 Section 365(h)
provides:
(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of
the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such
lease may treat the lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the al-
ternative, may remain in possession for the balance of the term of such
lease and any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by
such lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If such lessee remains in possession, such lessee may offset
against the rent reserved under such lease for the balance of the term
after the date of the rejection of such lease, and any such renewal or
extension, any damages occurring after such date caused by the non-
performance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such
lessee does not have any rights against the estate on account of any
damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such
offset.1
7 9
In many cases, the application of section 365(h) will be
straightforward. The trustee of the bankrupt lessor will first
177. Cf. Creedon & Zinman, supra note 168, at 1407 n.64 (suggesting that
cutting off the heat to a leased fiftieth floor office "Might so affect or impair the
lessee's right to possession that it might be considered a deprivation of his es-
tate" within the meaning of section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act).
178. Judge Fullam, however, did not foresee any difficulties in applying sec-
tion 365(h):
The House has recently passed H.R. 8200, which is a complete revi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 365(h) of that bill provides that
the lessor may reject, but the lessee may not be deprived of posses-
sion. The only remedy of the lessee is to terminate the lease or remain
in possession and offset damages arising from rejection against post-
rejection rentals. No matter how one views the line drawn in § 365(h),
the section has the advantage of bringing clarity to an area of bank-
ruptcy practice sorely in need of clarification.
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Some, however, thought that section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act clarified
the trustee's power to reject leases. "[Tihe rights and duties of a trustee with
respect to the rejection of ... unexpired leases of real property ... have been
specified and clearly defined [in section 70(b)]." Chandler, The Revised Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938, 24 A.B-.AJ. 880, 882 (1938). See Creedon & Zinman, supra
note 168, at 1399 n.36 (quoting this sentence and remarking that it was "the
most optimistic statement of the year"). Judge Fullam's optimistic statement
may well be proven accurate.
179. Bankruptcy Code § 365(h).
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decide whether the lease is burdensome. If it is, he will reject.
The lessee can then treat the lease as terminated and abandon
the premises without any liability. The lessee also has the op-
tion to continue occupation of the leased premises for the bal-
ance of the lease term. Because the trustee has rejected the
lease, he will no longer perform the services that the lease re-
quired of him. The tenant can perform these services himself
and deduct the cost from the rent due the trustee.
The following example illustrates several applications of
section 365(h). Assume that a lessee rents a warehouse from
the debtor for $1,000 per month, and the lease provides that the
debtor shall maintain the exterior of the building and heat the
interior. The debtor files for bankruptcy, and the trustee re-
jects the lease. The lessee can then treat the lease as termi-
nated and move out without any liability to the estate.
Alternatively, the lessee can remain in possession and offset
the cost of maintaining the exterior of the warehouse and heat-
ing the interior from the $1,000 per month rent due the estate.
Assume that the lessee elects to remain in possession and
spends $100 per month to heat the building. The lessee must
then pay the estate $900 per month. The lessee's treatment is
somewhat akin to that accorded a nonbankrupt party whose ex-
ecutory contract the trustee assumes and later breaches. Such
a nonbankrupt party receives an administrative expense claim
for damages from the breach and has some chance of recover-
ing most or all of his damages from the estate.180 The lessee re-
covers all of his damages from the breach of the lease through
the offset, not as an administrative expense, but as if he had a
fully secured claim.
Now assume that the lessee must spend $9,000 to fix the
roof and paint the exterior of the warehouse. The trustee's re-
jection damaged the lessee in the amount of $9,000, and the
lessee can offset that amount from the rent due under the
lease. The rent due is $900 per month, after the heat offset, so
the lessee does not have to pay the estate any rent for ten
months. At the end of ten months, the lessee's damages will
have been fully offset and the lessee will have to resume pay-
ing $900 per month to the estate.
Section 365(h) clearly provides for all situations in which
the damages to the lessee from the trustee's rejection are less
than the rent due under the remaining term of the lease. As-
sume, however, that the warehouse roof caves in just before
180. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
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bankruptcy. The lessee would have to spend $90,000 to repair
the roof, and only five years remain on the lease term. The off-
set of five years' rent will not fully compensate the lessee for
his damages from the trustee's rejection.
The lessee can argue that the trustee cannot reject the
lease and the obligation under it to maintain the exterior of the
building, because to do so would effectively deny the lessee his
option to remain in possession of the leased premises. Section
365(h) indicates that Congress intended that the trustee's re-
jection would not deprive the lessee of his alternative to remain
in possession. Furthermore, the legislative history indicates
that Congress thought section 365(h) would not deprive the
lessee "of his estate for the term for which he bargained.' 81
The trustee's failure to repair the roof would amount to a con-
structive eviction that would deprive the lessee of his estate.
The trustee has two arguments to support his position that
he can reject the lease obligation to repair the roof. First, re-
pairing the roof is exactly the sort of burdensome obligation
the trustee must be able to reject so as not to squander the re-
sources of the estate for the benefit of a single lessee to the det-
riment of all the creditors. 182 Second, section 365(h) (2) states
that the lessee has no rights against the estate, such as a right
to compel specific performance of a lease covenant, for any
damages from the nonperformance of any obligation of the
debtor under the lease, other than the right to an offset. 83 The
trustee's position is stronger in this example. Thus, in at least
some situations, section 365(h) allows the trustee to reject any
covenant, regardless of the effect that rejection will have on the
lessee's estate.
But suppose that the debtor owns and operates a number
of office buildings. Most of these buildings have been unprofita-
ble, so the debtor files for rehabilitation. One of the debtor's
buildings, however, has been profitable. It has thirty floors oc-
cupied by a variety of tenants. In order to acquire a prestigious
first tenant that would attract other tenants to the building, the
debtor leased the top floor to a law firm at a very favorable rate
181. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 349, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6306; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 60, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5846.
182. See Creedon & Zinman, supra note 168, at 1406 ("Professor MacLach-
lan, the major drafter of [section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act], said 'The re-
jection that I contemplate is the rejection of convenants to repair or build [that
are] beyond the capacity of an insolvent and which should not be performed at
the expense of his creditors simply because they relate to real estate."').
183. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
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of $9.00 per square foot. The other tenants pay $15.00 per
square foot, and the trustee would like to lease the top floor for
that amount. All the leases in the building require the lessor to
maintain and operate the elevators. The trustee has asked the
law firm to renegotiate its lease. He threatens to reject the
lease and keep the firm from using the building's elevators if
the firm does not agree to pay an increased rental. Section
365(h) does not protect the lessee in this situation if it is inter-
preted to allow the trustee to reject any lease obligation. Real-
istically, the law firm cannot occupy the building if the trustee
will not allow it to use the elevators. The right to offset dam-
ages here means only that the firm will have to pay nothing for
inaccessible offices on the thirtieth floor.
It would be unfortunate if the simple interpretation of sec-
tion 365(h) discussed above were complicated by limiting the
trustee's power to reject to those cases in which the lessee
would not effectively be deprived of possession by rejection.
Conveniently, a court would not have to vary the simple inter-
pretation of section 365(h) to protect the law firm in this case.
The court could protect the lessee from the trustee's inequita-
ble rejection by withholding its approval of that rejection. The
trustee seeks rejection here not to relieve the estate of a bur-
densome obligation, but to coerce the lessee into agreeing to
different lease terms. Section 365(a) conditions any rejection
on the court's approval, and the improper purpose of the
trustee's rejection should compel a court of equity to withhold
its approval.
B. INSTALLMENT LAND SALE CONTRACTS IN WHICH THE
NONDEBTOR BuYER IS IN POSSESSION
Large scale land developers, especially those who offer
property by mail, frequently use installment contracts to sell
homes to low- and middle-income consumers. Typically, in-
stallment land sale contracts require the vendor to deliver title
to the vendee only after the vendee has made all the contract
payments. 8 4 An installment land sale contract is executory
when the vendor has not delivered title and the vendee has not
made all the installment payments. 8 5 Under the Bankruptcy
Act, if the vendor went bankrupt while the contract was execu-
tory, the trustee might have tried to reject so that he could take
184. See generally Note, Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract, 23 CASE
W.L REV. 393 (1972).
185. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
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unencumbered title to the property and leave the installment
buyer with an unsecured claim for the payments already made.
In such a situation, some courts protected the vendee by re-
quiring the trustee to specifically perform the contract. 86
Other courts, however, allowed the trustee to reject, and did
not protect the vendee.187
Section 365(i) of the Bankruptcy Code' 8 8 provides an in-
stallment land sale vendee in possession the same protection
from the trustee's rejection that slaction 365(h) affords a real
property lessee1 89 Consider a person who purchases his house
from a builder under an installment contract providing for pay-
ment of $600 per month for twenty years. At the end of the
twenty years, the contract obligates the builder to deliver title
to the purchaser. Assume that three years after the buyer
moved in and began his payments, the builder goes bankrupt.
The trustee evaluates the contract, finds it burdensome, and re-
jects it. The buyer has the option to remain in possession. If
he elects that option, he must make the payments called for by
the contract, less any offset for damages that occur after the
date of rejection and that are caused by the builder's nonper-
formance of any obligation. If the buyer remains in possession,
he has no rights against the estate for damages other than the
186. See, e.g., England v. Santa Barbara Sav. & Loan (In re Morris Home
Dev. Co.), 4 Bnkr. Ct. Dec. 837 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See generally Lynn, Bank-
ruptcy and the Land Sales Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vis-A-Vis the
Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 677, 687-94 (1974); Note,
supra note 184.
187. See, e.g., In re New York Inv. Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
188. Section 365(i) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale
of real property under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser
may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in
possession of such real property.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession-
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due
under such contract, but may, offset against such payments any dam-
ages occurring after the date of the rejection of such contract caused
by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date,
but such purchaser does not have any rights against the estate on ac-
count of any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other
than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance
with the provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obliga-
tions to perform under such contract.
189. See .LR. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 349, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nuws 5963, 6306; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 60, reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5846. For a discussion of the pro-
tection that section 365(h) provides to a lessee of real property, see text accom-
panying notes 165-183 supra.
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offset; the trustee, however, must deliver title to the buyer in
accordance with the contract. The trustee has no obligations
under the rejected contract other than delivering title.190
Upon the trustee's rejection, the buyer also has the option
of treating the contract as terminated. In that case, section
365(j) grants the buyer "a lien on the interest of the debtor in
[the] property for the recovery of any portion of the purchase
price that [the buyer] has paid."' 91 If, before bankruptcy, the
buyer had not entered into possession of the property that he
had purchased under an installment contract, he would not
have a right, after rejection, to enter into possession and offset
his damages for the payments due under the contract. Section
365(j), however, grants a buyer not in possession a lien on the
property to secure the payments made under the contract.192
The lien granted by section 365(j) protects the buyer under a
rejected contract from being left with only a general unsecured
claim against the estate for the payments he made under the
contract before rejection.
V. CONCLUSION
The changes in bankruptcy law instituted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code promote treatment of executory contracts and
unexpired leases consistent with the law's treatment of other
property. The Code generally treats the debtor's rights in exec-
utory contracts and unexpired leases as another form of prop-
erty that passes to the trustee upon bankruptcy. A
prebankruptcy termination of a contract or lease is therefore
treated the same as a prebankruptcy transfer of other property
of the debtor. The Code's invalidation of bankruptcy clauses
prevents any termination of contracts or leases upon bank-
ruptcy. Similarly, the Code prevents transfer of other property
of the debtor upon bankruptcy.193 Just as the Code, through
the invalidation of restrictions on assignment, allows the
trustee to transfer the debtor's rights under executory con-
190. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(i) (2) (B).
191. Bankruptcy Code § 365(j). This section provides:
A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under sub-
section (i) of this section or a party whose -executory contract to
purchase real property from the debtor is rejected and under which
such party is not in possession, has a lien on the interest of the debtor
in such property for the recovery of any portion of the purchase price
that such purchaser or party has paid.
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 547.
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tracts and unexpired leases, the Code permits the trustee to
transfer the debtor's rights in other property. Finally, the Code
allows the trustee for a landlord debtor to shed burdensome
lease obligations, just as it allows the trustee to abandon bur-
densome property. 9 4
Executory contracts and unexpired leases differ from other
property of the estate in that they involve an ongoing relation-
ship between the trustee or his assignee and the nondebtor.
The Code generally treats the debtor's rights in executory con-
tracts and unexpired leases as another form of property, but it
makes several exceptions to this rule in recognition of the
ongoing relationship with the nondebtor. These exceptions
protect the nondebtor's right to get the benefit of his bargain
with the debtor through his relationship with the trustee or his
assignee. The Code's prohibition of the trustee's assumption of
nondelegable contracts and leases without the nondebtor's con-
sent allows the nondebtor himself to determine whether the
trustee will perform adequately. In contracts and leases in
which there has been a default, the Code requires the trustee,
if he wishes to assume, to cure the default and provide ade-
quate assurance of future performance. This directs the court
to ensure that the trustee provides the nondebtor with the ben-
efit of his bargain. If the trustee wishes to assign a contract or
lease, even if there has not been a default, he must still con-
vince the court that the nondebtor will get the benefit of his
bargain. The Code, in short, attempts to strike a balance be-
tween two sometimes competing considerations: the right of a
nondebtor to get the performance for which he bargained; and
the right of the general creditors to get the benefit, through the
trustee, of the debtor's bargain.
194. Id.§ 554.
[Vol. 64.341
